Abstract-Government information is a vital asset that must be kept in a trusted environment and efficiently managed by authorised parties. Even though e-Government provides a number of advantages, it also introduces a range of new security risks. Sharing confidential and top-secret information in a secure manner among government sectors tend to be the main element that government agencies look for. Thus, developing an effective methodology is essential and it is a key factor for e-Government success. The proposed e-Government scheme in this paper is a combination of identity-based encryption and biometric technology. This new scheme can effectively improve the security in authentication systems, which provides a reliable identity with a high degree of assurance. In addition, this paper demonstrates the feasibility of using Finite-state machines as a formal method to analyse the proposed protocols.
INTRODUCTION
E-Government mainly acts as a communication bridge whether between government to citizen, or government to government, or government to business in efficient and reliable ways through effective use of information technology. The main challenge in e-government is to develop a framework, which promotes exchanging data securely among government agencies. While e-government provides a number of advantages, it also introduces a range of new security risks. Sharing confidential and top-secret information in a secure manner among government sectors tend to be the main element that government agencies look for.
When e-Government systems were being designed, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) seemed to be the best solution for the scheme. PKI is presently deployed in most e-Government implementations, as it is perceived as a mature technology, which is widely supported and can be easily integrated with different systems. Examples of e-government initiatives that apply PKI on a large scale are the US eGov initiative (www.usa.gov) supported by Federal PKI [1] , the Saudi Arabian e-Government Program (yesser.gov.sa) [2] .
One of the main issues concerning the security perspective in e-Government is to grant access to authorised users as well as the need to verify that the user is really who they claim to be. The most common solution to this problem is to deploy a PKI [3] and digital signatures in large-scale e-Government systems. Even though PKI supports strong authentication and digital signature, it has a few disadvantages. For example, users must be pre-enrolled, certificate directories can leak some critical information, key recovery is difficult and costly and boundary services (anti-spam, anti-virus, archiving) integration is very difficult [4] .
Thus, to take the full advantages of the capabilities of eGovernment, end users need robust security solutions to achieve assurance when dealing with e-Government systems. A variant of public key cryptography that derives public keys directly from unique identity information (such as an e-mail address) known by the user is called Identity-Based Cryptography (IBC). This approach has recently received considerable attention from researchers [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] , as the development of ID-Based Cryptography offers great flexibility and obviates the requirement for user certificates since the identity of the user can be transformed into encryption keys and used for authentication. To develop a new secure cryptosystem for e-Government, several schemes were investigated to determine which protocol would be suitable for the research. We propose a biometric-ID-based scheme using Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC), which is an improved combination scheme derived from two schemes [10, 11] . The proposed scheme is secure under the Computational DiffieHellman Assumption (CDHA) and tackles the security drawbacks of He et al.'s scheme and Li Hwang's scheme. To overcome these, we applied a symmetric key cryptosystem to prevent attackers from altering or gaining any important information in the login and authentication messages.
The structure of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we review related works on ID-Based Cryptography and Biometric authentication and briefly describe both He et al.'s and Li Hwang schemes. In Section 3, we design the new Biometric-ID-based Authentication Scheme. In section 4, we model the new protocol with finite-state machine. Then, we provide a brief discussion on security analysis and comparisons with related schemes in section 5. Finally, the conclusion is given in Section 6.
II. REVIEW OF RELATED WORKS
Without a secure and trusted infrastructure, organisations, such as governments, would leave data electronically unsecured and vulnerable to attacks. Therefore, governments are constantly looking for ways to deliver secure and reliable www.conference.thesai.org services. ID-Based Cryptography introduces a lightweight key management and offers encryption for data confidentiality and robust authentication, which are prerequisite for securing highvalue transactions.
The idea of ID-based cryptography was originally proposed by Shamir in 1984 [12] , but practical ID-based encryption schemes were not developed until recently. In 2001, Boneh & Franklin [5] developed a fully functional IDbased encryption scheme, which can be constructed efficiently by using Weil pairing on elliptic curves. In ID-based cryptosystems, there is a trusted third party called a Private Key Generator (PKG) who is responsible for generating the secret keys for all users. As a result, a PKG holds the users' private keys. If a PKG is malicious, it can impersonate any user and therefore decrypt any cipher text or forge signature on any message. This can lead to a problem known as key escrow [13, 14] .
There is no question that the Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) scheme brings many advantages such as eliminating the need to distribute public keys. The enforcement of the private key generation by the Private Key Generator raises concerns of key escrow and/or privacy surrounding the management of private keys. To address this particular problem of key escrow, an implementation of biometric identification systems can be used as a private key. Biometric technology and verification systems offer a number of benefits to government sectors and users [15, 16] .
He et al. [10] proposed an ID-based remote mutual authentication with key agreement scheme on ECC. This protocol attempts to cope with many of the well-known security and efficiency problem. However, the scheme has a potential flaw that may lead to man-in-the-middle attack and impersonation attack [17, 18] . It can be seen that, if an attacker E eavesdrops and listens to the communication between S i and C i . Then, E can intercept a valid login request Biometric technologies are becoming fundamental elements in ensuring highly secure identification and personal verification solutions [15] . Biometric keys can be extracted from keystroke patterns, the human voice [19] , fingerprints [20, 21] , handwritten signatures [22] , and facial characteristics [23] .
Li and Hwang [11] proposed an efficient biometrics-based remote user authentication scheme using smart cards. The security of their scheme is based on one-way hash function, biometrics verification, smart card and it uses nonce. The scheme is very efficient in computation cost, which has been proved to be relatively low compared with other related schemes [24] [25] [26] [27] . The scheme is composed of four phases namely; the registration phase, the login phase, the authentication phase and password change phase.
One of the key characteristics of the cryptographic hash function is that the outputs are very sensitive to small perturbations in their inputs. Hash functions cannot be applied directly when the input data are noisy such as biometrics [28] . Therefore, a secure one-way hash function cannot be used for biometric verification. In the login phase of Li-Hwang's scheme, the user computes h(B i ) based on personal biometric template B i . Then, the biometric authentication process relies on comparing the hash value h(B i ) with f i . However, the scheme does not seem to be able to handle natural variation in the biometrics. For example, when the user logs in, his fresh biometric sample has to match exactly the template recorded during the registration phase, which never happens in practice. Thus, the protocol is fundamentally flawed and does not fulfil the basic objectives of a biometric authentication protocol. As a result, this may prevent a legal user from passing biometric verification at the login phase. So, the Li-Hwang's scheme is vulnerable to denial-of-service attack. The scheme is also prone to man-in-middle-attack and impersonation attack. The attacker can cheat the server by impersonating the user or can impersonate the server to cheat the user without knowing any secret information [29] [30] [31] Combining ID based cryptography with biometric techniques can effectively improve the security in authentication systems, which provides a reliable identity with a high degree of assurance. The biometric technology is regarded as a powerful solution due to its unique link to an identity individual, which almost impossible to fake.
Thus, a biometric identity is an inherent trait, which will always remain with the person all the time. In another words, using biometric techniques in IBE will mean that the person will always have their private key available.
III. PROPOSED SCHEME This research will focus on secure e-Government systems and improve their authentication and communication. To guarantee the security of these distributed systems, biometrics verification and ID-based cryptography are used. The proposed protocol is based on the following assumptions:
We assume that shared secrets in registration phase will never be disclosed.
We assume that cryptographic algorithms are secure. For example, it is impossible to decrypt a ciphertext without prior knowledge of the secret key.
We assume that both client and server are able to generate a random number securely.
The security of the proposed scheme is based on the intractability of the following two mathematical problems on elliptic curves [5, 10] :
Given P, xP, yP ∈ G, it is hard to compute xyP ∈ G.
b) Collision Attack Assumption 1 (k-CAA1): For an integer k, and x∈ Zn*, P ∈ G ,given c) (P, xP, h0, (h1, (h1+x)-1P),….,(hk, (hk+x)-1P)) ,
where hi ∈ Zn*, and distinct for 0
The proposed scheme consists of four phases: system initialising phase, registration phase, login phase, and authentication phase. The notations used throughout this paper are summarised in TABLE 1. www.conference.thesai.org 
1) System initializing phase
In this phase, we follow the steps in He et al.'s scheme where the server S i generates parameters of the system.
Step 1: S i chooses an elliptic curve equation E P (a, b).
Step 2: S i selects a base point P with the order n over E P (a, b)
Step 3: S i selects its master key x and secret information y and computes public key Pub_K s = xP
Step 4: The server chooses four secure one-way hash function H 1 (.), H 2 (.), H 3 (.), H 4 (.), where H(.) is a known hash function that takes a string and assigns it to a point on the elliptic curve, i.e. H(A) = QA on E, where C is usually based on the identity 
2) Registration Phase
A user C i with identifier ID C i should be registered first before using the services provided by R i . Users may use their employee number as an identity when contacting R i for authorisation. In this phase, C i needs to perform the following steps.
Step 1: User C i inputs their ID C i , personal biometrics Bio C i , on a specific biometric device, and provides the password PW C i to R i via a secure channel (or to the registration centre in person).
Step 2: R i reads current timestamp T S i , and computes the following:
Step 3: R i computes C i 's private key using the system private key x and C i 's public key.
Step 4: R i stores {ID C i , H 4 (.), Enc{ } a /Dec{ } a , f i , e i , τ, Pr_K C i } on a secure database and sends it to the user via a secure channel, where Enc{ } a /Dec{ } a is a symmetric encryption with secret key a and and τ is a predetermined threshold [28] for biometric verification.
3) Login Phase
The user C i sends a login request to the server S i and performs the following steps:
Step 1: C i enters the ID C i and PW C i , and then S i verifies the authenticity of client's identity and password.
Step 2: C i submits the Bio C i on specific biometric device, then verifies the following:
Step 3: if the above does not hold, it means the biometric information does not match the template stored in system. Thus C i does not pass the biometric verification process and the authentication scheme is terminated. Otherwise, C i passes the biometric verification and computes the following:
Where r C i ∈ Z * n is a random number generated by the user. For this step, the random value r C i is introduced to mask the hash of the secret value H4 (ID C i || y).
Step 4: C i computes k = H 2 (ID C i , T C i , W 1 , M 2 ), where T C i is a timestamp denoting the current time.
Step 5: Finally, C i encrypts the message {ID C i , T C i , W 1 , M 3 , MAC k (ID C i , T C i , W 1 , M 3 )} a and sends it to the server S i
4) Authentication Phase
After receiving the request login message, S i and C i will perform the following steps for mutual authentication.
Step 1: S i decrypts the message {ID C i , T C i , W 1 , M 3 , MAC k (ID C i , T C i , W 1 , M 3 )} a , then checks the validity of ID C i and the freshness of T C i . The freshness of T C i is checked by performing T -T C i ≤ ∆T, where T ̀ is the time when S i receives the above message and ∆T is a valid time interval. The case where ID C i is not valid or T C i is not fresh, then S i aborts the current session.
Step 2: If Step 1 holds, S i computes the following:
S i checks the integrity of MAC k (ID C i , T C i , W 1 , M 3 ) with the key k. S i will quit the current session if the check produces a negative result. Where M 5 is the random value r C i of the user C i and only S i can unmask the value because it can compute H 4 (ID C i || y)
Step 4: Then, S i encrypts the message {ID C i , T S i , W 2 , M 6 , M 7 , MAC k (ID C i , T S i , W 2 , M 6 , M 7 )} a and sends it to C i
Step 5: Upon receiving the S i 's message, C i first decrypts {ID C i , T S i , W 2 , M 6 , M 7 , MAC k (ID C i , T S i , W 2 , M 6 , M 7 )} a , and checks the freshness of T S i is by performing T'-T S i ≤ ∆T, where T ̀ is the time when C i receives the above message and ∆T is the expected time interval for the transmission delay.
Step 6: C i verifies whether M 7 ≟ H 4 (M 3 || r C i ) and checks the integrity of MAC k (ID C i , T S i , W 2 , M 6 , M 7 ) with the key k. C i will quit the current session if the check produces a negative result.
Step 7: If it holds, C i believes that S i is authenticated and then computes the following:
Where M 9 is the random value r S i of the server S i and only the client C i , which know M 1 = H 4 (ID C i || y), can send back the correct hashed value of M 9 = H 4 (H 4 (ID C i || y) ⊕ r S i ) || r S i )
Step 8: C i sends the encrypted message {M 9, MAC k (M 9 ) } a to S i
Step 9: After receiving C i 's message, S i decrypts Enc{M 9 } a and check the integrity of MAC k (M 9 ). Then, S i verifies whether M 9 ≟ H 4 (M 6 || r S i )
Step The FSM is used to model the communication channel of proposed protocol between the Client C i and the Server S i . Since the exchange of packets follows a pattern defined by a finite set of rules, it will be described by creating two finitestate machines FSM server and FSM client .
A. Server FSM
The FSM at the server side represents the various on-going communications with the client at any point of time. It is modelled using 10 states and 22 transitions as detailed below. The client ID is invalid
The freshness of T -T C i ≥ ∆T Negative result when checking the integrity of
At any stage of FSM server , FSM server aborts the current session and changes to state S9 if the timeout exceeds the defined TIME_WAIT while waiting for packets. This feature helps to prevent an infinite wait when the FSM client fails to response.
B. Client FSM
The FSM at the client side represents the various on-going transmissions with the server at any point of time. It is modelled using 9 states and 21 transitions as detailed below. Fig. 1 shows the transitions diagram for the FSM client . S AND COMPARISIONS proposed scheme is wellty by using symmetric ake procedure. Also, it a Message Authentication the MAC function takes as www.conference.thesai.org input a secret key and data block and produces a hash value [33] . The client and server transmit the MAC value during the login and authentication phases. However, both client and server will be aware if an attacker alters the message because the integrity check of MAC value fails. When the communication session between C i and S i is over, the session key sk is discarded and a new session key is used in every protocol run to prevent a replay attack.
1) First, the FSM client is in the initial

Mutual authentication and session key agreement
Based on FSM model, we proved that the protocol accomplished mutual authentication and secret session key agreement between a remote client and the server by establishing three-way challenge-response handshake technique. First, the client C i sends the login request message {ID C i , T C i , W 1 
Denial-of-service-attack
Our scheme can withstand denial-of-service attack, because when the client C i imprints personal biometrics Bio * C i , the S i will check the validity of Bio * C i with stored template by checking whether d(Bio C i , Bio * C i ) < τ holds. According to [31] , the Bio * C i could pass the verification process even though there is some slight difference between Bio C i , Bio
As for the computation cost, the proposed protocol is relatively low cost and efficient since only symmetric encryption; hash operations and XOR operations are required. Moreover, it is based on ECC which has significant advantages over other public-key cryptography. ECC provides the same security level of RSA cryptosystem but with a shorter key length and faster computation [34] In TABLE 2, we summarised the performance and demonstrated comparisons between the proposed scheme and other related schemes. The evaluation parameters are defined in TABLE 3. Even though the number of operations is more than in other schemes, our scheme holds other security properties. The proposed protocol is based on a two-factor user authentication mechanism and it is obvious that it takes few more hash operations and XOR operations for the server and client. Due to the security weaknesses in related schemes, we applied symmetric encryption and symmetric decryption to ensure the confidentiality and the integrity of transmitted packets. Therefor this feature makes the proposed scheme effective. The paper demonstrates how a combination of ID-based encryption with biometrics can be effective and more suited to e-Government environments. Moreover, the new biometricidentity-based scheme can be integrated into e-Government systems as the main authentication method and for secure communication as well. The proposed scheme is aimed to initiate secure authentication and communication between the client and server by building a robust mechanism between communicating government parties. The presented protocol is described as a three-way handshake procedure to establish a reliable connection and ensure secure data sharing.
In future, an in-depth security analysis and evaluation will be conducted to overcome security vulnerabilities and weakness. Furthermore, it is essential to consider using Petri Net (PN) [35] to simulate the communication patterns between the server and client as well as to validate the protocol functionality. First, we will model the protocol without an intruder. Then, we will add the intruder to PN and implement a token-passing scheme. At this stage, we will test different attacks, such as impersonation attack, man-in-the-middle attack, and replay attack against the proposed scheme and verify the security requirements.
